12
Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales
sino que además fue forzada a aceptar a los diplomáticos
de las potencias occidentales después de la derrota en la
Guerra del Opio del siglo XIX:
Yet China’s participation in aspects of the Westphalian
structure carried with it an ambivalence born of the
history that brought it to enter into the international
system. China has not forgotten that it was originally
forced to engage with the existing international order
in a manner utterly at odds with its historical image of
itself or, for that matter, with the avowed principles
of the Westphalian system. When urged to adhere
to the international system‘s rules of the game’ and
‘responsabilities’ the visceral reaction of many Chinese
–including senior leaders- has been profoundly affected
by the awareness that China has not participated in
making the rules of the system. They are asked –and,
as a matter of prudence, have agreed– to adhere to
rules they had had not part in making. But they expect
–and sooner or later will act on this expectation– the
international order to evolve in a way that enables China
to become centrally involved in further international
rule making, even to the point of revising some of the
rules that prevail (ibid., p. 225).
De manera que la cuestión clave es si tal expectativa
china («que el orden internacional evolucione de una
manera que permita a China involucrarse plenamente
en la elaboración de las reglas del sistema internacional
futuro incluyendo la cuestión de revisar algunas de las
normas que prevalecen») puede efectivamente llevarse a
cabo porque en eso consiste, precisamente, la diferencia
entre el realismo ofensivo de Mearsheimer y el realismo
clásico de Kissinger.
En efecto, conforme a la perspectiva de Mearsheimer,
las potencias no buscan primordialmente mantener el statu
quo porque siempre están en la búsqueda de asegurar
su supervivencia mediante el incremento de su poder y